Steve Quayle News Alerts

June 30, 2003
David Hughes Washington

Hair-trigger ICBM standoff hasn't changed, but the U.S. and Russia could back off in stages outlined in a Rand study

Perilous Nuclear Shadow

Russia's early warning system, designed to detect an ICBM attack in the event of a nuclear war with the U.S., is in such a shambles that leaders in Moscow might have trouble in a crisis telling a false alarm from the real thing, according to a Rand report.

In addition, Russia has so few ballistic missile submarines on patrol or mobile ICBMs on the road that hardly any of its strategic nuclear forces are likely to survive a first strike. And U.S. Trident submarines could launch missiles that could take out hardened targets, including ICBMs in silos or fixed sites, in a matter of 10-15 min. The upshot is that Russian leaders in a crisis might be forced to act on incomplete information in a matter of minutes in deciding whether to launch an all-out retaliatory nuclear strike against America, according to Rand analysts. Otherwise they face the prospect of having little left to retaliate with due to weak and decaying nuclear forces.

Nowadays Russia is only able to keep one or two ballistic missile submarines at sea with 64 warheads each and only 9-18 mobile ICBMs with single warheads on the road, according to the Rand study, "Beyond the Nuclear Shadow." It was supported by former Sen. Sam Nunn's Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) foundation. The NTI is a private group working to reduce the peril of nuclear weapons. The rest of Russia's ICBMs are at fixed sites that can be targeted by the U.S. with great accuracy.

NTI asked the Rand team to look at the continuing possibility of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons based on the way U.S. and Russian forces are postured. David E. Mosher, one of the four authors of the Rand study, said Nunn is alarmed at the limited time national leaders may have in a crisis to make decisions on the use of nuclear weapons.

Mosher said the Russians are very concerned about the highly accurate and powerful W-88 warheads on missiles in U.S. Trident submarines. W-88s yield 450 kilotons and could take out hardened targets in Russia, including the country's leaders. So even though political relations are improving between the U.S. and Russia, the nuclear weapon standoff remains reminiscent of the climate prevalent during the Cold War. The Rand analysts note some experts believe Russian forces are poised to launch ICBMS within 12 min. of warning that an attack may be in progress.

Bruce Blair, president of the Center for Defense Information think tank based here, said the danger of a false warning or a mistaken launch has decreased since the end of the Cold War. "But it remains a serious concern that de-alterting [of nuclear forces] would address," he said. Blair agrees with the Rand analysts on the idea of withdrawing U.S. Trident submarines from forward-deployed patrols and believes this idea might be acceptable to U.S. military strategists. There are usually four or five Trident submarines stationed within a 15min. missile flight time to Russia, theoretically posing a threat of command decapitation. "Keep in mind also that George W. Bush, the candidate, embraced de-alerting in principle," Blair said, adding that he thinks senior Bush administration officials are "at least sympathetic" to the idea of backing off from the current operational posture.

In 1995, Russia's early warning coverage was much better, with 100% surveillance of U.S. ICBM silos and some capability for oceanic surveillance. This turned out to be critically important when a Russian early warning radar detected a ballistic missile launch in the Barents Sea area where U.S. ballistic missile submarines operate. President Boris Yeltsin accessed his "nuclear football" and waited for word from his generals on whether it was a U.S. attack, according to the Rand study that cites earlier reports of this incident. Russian early warning satellites showed U.S. ICBMs in their silos, reinforcing the perception that the launch was a false alarm. Actually, it was a NASA sounding rocket launched from Norway toward the North Pole, but the U.S. pre-notification of Russian authorities of the launch had gotten lost in the bureaucracy.

These gaps in Russia's early warning radar system were identified in 1999 by Theodore A. Postol of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology. New phased array radars were never completed, leaving open attack corridors.

IN THE YEAR of that launch, Russia had nine Oko satellites in highly elliptical Molniya orbits with infrared sensors to track any ICBM missile launches from the U.S. around the clock. These satellites are designed to observe missiles against the cold background of space, since Russia never mastered look-down capability as the U.S. did. The Oko constellation includes a large number of satellites to focus on a small area on the Earth. But now only one or two of these six satellites are working properly and this only provides about 6 hr. of coverage a day, according to the Rand report. One reason may be a fire that occurred at the Oko ground control station in 2001. It isn't clear if control has been restored.

And Russia's coverage of oceanic areas where U.S. ballistic missile submarines operate is even more limited, Mosher said. The Oko constellation provides little oceanic coverage, and a second satellite designed for geosynchronous orbit, the Prognoz, is designed as a backup for Oko on the U.S. ICBM silos. While Prognoz might provide some oceanic coverage, none of these satellites is currently operational. In addition, there are two corridors of airspace from the Barents Sea and the Pacific Ocean all the way to Moscow that are not covered by Russian ground-based ballistic missile warning radars. So the chances of the Russians spotting the launch or flight of a ballistic missile from a Trident submarine before it strikes its targets are limited or nonexistent, according to the Rand analysis.

"SO THE SUM of all our fears in this is we have a blind, vulnerable Russia that might be compelled to launch very quickly in a crisis based on very little, if any, early warning information," Mosher concluded. And if there was a detonation on Russian soil, how could Russian leaders know if it came from the U.S., a terrorist, a ballistic missile from the South or detonation of an aging Russian weapon? he asked at a briefing on his study at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace here.

"Today the greatest threat from Russia comes not from its strength, but from its weakness," the Rand report notes. Mosher added that the size and readiness of Russia's nuclear forces are plummeting, in part due to a troubled economy, at a time when the country is relying more and more on nuclear forces to make up for the fraying of its conventional military capability.

Mosher outlined the phased approach he and his colleagues formulated for deescalating the nuclear standoff between Russia and the U.S. The Rand team examined the following options:

* The U.S. provide assistance to improve Russia's early warning radars or satellites. For example, Russian scientists say six completed Oko satellites are ready to be launched but Russia doesn't have the money to do it. But to fund Russia's satellite network and provide technical help would cost the U.S. $1.3 billion over five years.

* Establish a joint early warning system by placing sensors outside U.S. and Russian missile silos. Mosher said this option intrigued the Rand analysts, and it is based on an experiment already conducted at U.S. and Russian nuclear materials storage facilities. The sensors at each silo would detect the motion, sound and heat of a launch, and there would be a video camera with continuous coverage.

* Immediately stand down all nuclear forces to be eliminated under the 2002 Moscow Treaty. (The U.S. and Russia agreed to reduce nuclear forces to 2,200 warheads over the next decade, down from 10,000 each in 1990.)

* Pull U.S. ballistic missile submarines away from Russia.

* Pull U.S. attack submarines away from Russia (as Russia only has 1-2 ballistic missile submarines at sea as part of its deterrent).

* Remove W-88 warheads from Trident missiles and replace them with less accurate and powerful warheads that are not viewed by the Russians as hard-target killers.

* Reduce day-to-day launch readiness of 150 ICBMs in silos initially and then expand the number of silos once confidence is established. As with many of these options, verification is an issue that has to be taken into consideration.

* Install destruct-after-launch mechanisms on ballistic missiles.

* Deploy limited U.S. missile defenses. This would help defeat any missiles launched by mistake or without authorization. However, the Russians might react to the creation of an American antimissile shield by adding countermeasures to their ICBMs which would then defeat the shield even in the event of an accidental launch. And the Rand study doesn't favor a robust missile defense system because it would make Russian leaders nervous.

Mosher said he and his colleagues realize that not all of these options can be considered for action in the immediate future. As the study notes, "some of the steps require the upending of years of orthodoxy about deterrence and the way that nuclear forces are postured and operated." So the team came up with a phased approach to improving nuclear security dubbed "the nuclear security initiative."

For example, in the first six months to a year the U.S. might unilaterally stand down its forces to Moscow Treaty levels, pull its subs away from Russia and reduce launch readiness in U.S. silos. It could then agree to put early warning sensors on U.S. silos, fund Russian early warning radar improvements and continue the Russian-American Observational Satellite (Ramos) program, a joint venture by U.S. and Russian scientists to improve early warning technology for both nations.

These steps would create the confidence needed for more difficult options that could be pursued in the second and third year and then within 5-7 years of the start of nuclear de-alerting.

Rose Gottemoeller, a former U.S. Energy Dept. official who also served on the National Security Council, said the potential is there for the Rand study to have a practical influence on bilateral efforts to reform the U.S. and Russian strategic relationship. Gottemoeller, who is now a senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, noted that an upcoming decision by the U.S. to either upgrade its nuclear weapons or focus on stewardship could have a significant impact on this relationship.

Aviation Week & Space Technology 06/30/2003, page 66
http://www.aviationnow.com/