August 14, 2004
FOREWARD COMMENTARY: This threat is real and imminent. A pre-emptive strike could very well be in the works - the tools to do the job are deployed and in place.
Russian made R-27 (SS-N-6) nuclear ballistic missile NATO name "SERB".
North Korea to build new missiles using Soviet design
August 04, 2004 Posted: 11:39 Moscow time (07:39 GMT)
North Korea is deploying new land- and sea-based ballistic missiles apparently to be based on a decomissioned Soviet submarine-launched ballistic missile, the R-27. They can carry nuclear warheads and may have sufficient range to hit the United States, Jane's Defence Weekly said Wednesday.
North Korea is deploying new land- and sea-based ballistic missiles that can carry nuclear warheads and may have sufficient range to hit the United States. Communist Korea had acquired the know-how during the 1990s from Russian missile specialists and by buying 12 former Soviet submarines which had been sold for scrap metal but retained key elements of their missile launch systems, Jane's Defence Weekly said Wednesday.
In an article published Wednesday, Jane's said the two new systems appeared to be based on a decomissioned Soviet submarine-launched ballistic missile, the R-27. Jane's, which did not specify its sources, said the sea-based missile was potentially the more threatening of the two new weapons systems.
"It would fundamentally alter the missile threat posed by the DPRK (Democratic People's Republic of Korea) and could finally provide its leadership with something that it has long sought to obtain ˆ the ability to directly threaten the continental U.S.," the weekly said. Apart from targeting the United States, South Korea or Japan, cash-strapped North Korea might seek to sell the technology to countries that have bought its missiles in the past, with Iran a prime candidate, the article added.
Ian Kemp, news editor of Jane's Defence Weekly, said North Korea would only spend the money and effort on developing such missiles if it intended to fit t hem with nuclear warheads. "It's pretty certain the North Koreans would not be developing these unless they were intended for weapons of mass destruction warheads, and the nuclear warhead is far and away the most potent of those," he told Reuters.
North Korea pulled out of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in January 2003 and is locked in long-running crisis talks with the United States, China, Russia, Japan and South Korea over terms for scrapping its atomic weapons programme. The extent of that programme remains unclear, although North Korea's deputy foreign minister was quoted as telling a senior U.S. official last year that Pyongyang possessed nuclear weapons.
Jane's said the new land-based system had an estimated range of 2,500 to 4,000 km (1,560 to 2,500 miles), and the sea-based system, launchable from a submarine or a ship, had a range of at least 2,500 km. "If you can get a missile aboard a warship, in particular aboard a submarine...you can move your submarine to strike at targets such as Hawaii or the United States, just as examples. Whereas it would be much more difficult to actually develop a ground-launched missile to achieve that sort of a range," Kemp said.
Until now only the United States, Russia, Britain, France and China have been known to possess submarine-launched nuclear weapons, although there has been speculation that Israel has a similar capability. Jane's said North Korea appeared to have acquired the R-27 technology from Russian missile experts based in the Urals city of Chelyabinsk. It said one such group was detained in 1992 when about to fly to North Korea, but others visited later.
It said Pyongyang was also helped by the purchase, through a Japanese trading company, of 12 decommissioned Russian Foxtrot-class and Golf II-class submarines
which were sold for scrap in 1993. It said the missiles and electronic firing systems had been removed, but the vessels retained their launch tubes and stabilisation sub-systems.
http://www.russiajournal.com/news/cnews-article.shtml?nd=44909
MY ANALYSIS OF THE ABOVE:
Number One --- The Russian FOXTROT class diesel submarines were never capable of launching ballistic missiles. I have tremendous doubts, nearing the level of impossibility, that the North Koreans have converted old Russian FOXTROT's to Ballistic Missile Submarines so that even a single missile like the R-27 could be carried within the hull of the boat.
An outside, remote possibility is that the R-27 launch tube might be fitted to the topside of a FOXTROT hull forward of the conning tower. This would follow some earlier and decades old versions of Soviet ballistic missiles which were so mounted. The Foxtrot is a deisel powered and noisy old submarine. They were easy to detect while submerged in the 1980's when I tracked them daily in the LANT and the MED. Having to surface to fire a ballistic missile mounted forward of the conning tower would make them even more of a target - are North Korean submarine commanders suicidal?
Commercial surface cargo freighters is a much more likely conversion carrier of such ballistic missile launch tube mounted vertically in their holds below decks.
Russian GOLF-II class submarines are a legitimate candidate to carry R-27 missiles.
GOLF-II Class Ballistic Missile Submarine
The 'GOLF II" class boats were converted from the 'GOLF I' class, receiving the new SS-N-5 missile in place of the SS-N-4. The SS-N-5 could be launched while submerged.
Closeup of a GOLF-II missile launch tube.
The missile in question, the R-27, is also known as the SS-N-6 NATO name "SERB". An image of it appears above at the yop of this post.
FAS Data on this missile follows:
quote:
R-27 / SS-N-6 SERB
The R-27 / SS-N-6 submarine-launched ballistic missile is a single-stage, storable liquid-propellant missile. Three variants were deployed using an inertial guidance system, while a fourth variant [the SS-NX-13] used radio command guidance. One of the inertially-guided variants carried multiple re-entry vehicles [MRV] that were not independently targetted.
The missile was first seen publicly in a Moscow parade in 1967. By the mid-1970s Western intelligence believed that the SS-N-6 Mod 1 delivered a 1500-1b reentry vehicle to a maximum operational range of 1300 nm with a CEP of about 0.6 nm. The SS-N-6 Mod 2 was believed to deliver a 1,500-lb reentry vehicle to a maximum operational range of 1,600 nm. The SS-N-6 Mod 3 was assessed as having MRV payload consisting of two 600-lb RVs or three 400-lb RVs. Both the Mod 2 and Mod 3 were thought to have a CEP of about 0.7 nm. The yield of the single RV Mod 1 and Mod 2 was believed to be 0.6 to 1.2 MT. The yield of each warhead in the 2-MRV variant of the Mod 3 was estimated at 0.4 to 0.8 MT, and the yield of each warhead in the 3-MRV variant at 0.1 to 0.4 MT. The existence of a 2-MRV variant of the Mod 3 is not reported by Russian sources.
Sixteen of the SS-N-6 missiles were carried aboard the Yankee class nuclear submarine. Missiles could be launched while the submarine was submerged and underway. According to Western estimates, normal reaction time, while the submarine was submerged on patrol, was about 15 minutes. Reaction time under conditions of peak alert is one minute. The allowable hold time under conditions of peak alert was one hour. The Yankee submarine demonstrated a patrol capability of 75 days, and patrols of longer duration (90 days) were believed possible, consistent with crew provisioning and morale.
The D-5 launch system with R-27 missiles originated with studies by SKB-385 in the early 1960s to develop a ballistic missile capable of attacking sea -based targets. Development work resulted from a proposal by SKB-385 in late 1961 for the development of a launch system with a light single-stage missile for strikes against strategic land targets. The Yankee I submarnes were the designated carrier. On 24 April 1962 the project was officially authorized.
One distinctive innovation in this design was the placement of the rocket engines within the fuel tank in order to reduce the external dimensions of the vehicle. The missile body was made of aluminium alloys, and the fuel and oxidizer tanks had common bottoms. The command and control avionics systems were was placed in a hermetically sealed container in the lower interior of the oxidizer tank, eliminating the need for a separate instrument module. Another design innovation was the placement of the command system's sensors on a gyro-stabilized platform. These design features characterize all subsequent liquid-propellant SLBMs developed by SKB-385.
The propulsion system has a single-chamber sustainer and a dual-chamber control engine. The thrust chambers of the attitude control engine were oriented at an angle of 45 degrees from the stabilization axis of the missile (instead of the usual scheme in which the four thrust chambers are aligned along the stabilization axis). Due to an increased thrust ratio the R-26 missile had four times the range of the R-13 missile (2400 km against 600 km) despite its similar launching weight (14.2 versus 13.7 tons).
The missile was loaded in the launching tube with the use of several metallized rubber shock absorbers. Together with the lack of aerodynamic stabilizers, this allowed a significant reduction in the overall dimensions of the launch tube. The missile was fired from a flooded tube. A gas bubble generated by the missile's docking adapter dampened the hydraulic shock caused by engine ignition in the tube.
Testing of the D-5 launch system took place in three phases. During the first phase 12 pop-up tests were conducted from a flooded platform an d a converted 613 submarine. Data from these tests was used to perfect underwater launch, rocket engine and launch tube designs. The second phase from June 1966 through April 1967 consisted of 12 successful launches (out of 17) from a ground platform. The test phases concluded with 6 missile firings from 667Ä submarines of the Northern fleet. Deployment began on 13 March 1968.
On 10 June 1971 it was decided to upgrade the D-5 launch system and the R-27 missiles. The modernized missile, with a more powerful engine and improved guidance system, was designated as R-27U and the launching system received the designation D-5U. The R-27U was designed to carry both single and multiple warheads. The upgraded missile was supposed to have the same maximum range as the original R-27, though equipped with three multiple reentry vehicles. The range and accuracy of the single warhead version of the R-27U was supposed to increase in 20 and 15 percent respectively.
Between September 1972 and August 1973 a total of 16 R-27U missiles were successfully launched from a submarine. On 04 January 1971 deployment of the D-5U launch system began. Yankee II and upgraded Yankee I submarines were outfitted with the new system and missiles.
The R-27U missile and D-5U launch system remained in service through 1990. Over the life of the program the service life of the missile was increased from five years to thirteen years.
The R-27K (SS-NX-13) modification featured a nose cone with a terminal guidance system. This missile, designated 4K18, was designed to attack both coastal radiocontrol installations and moving targets at sea. The R-27K missile was tested in 1974 on board the converted "K-102" 629 Golf submarine.
Between 1968 and 1988 the D-5 launch system conducted 492 missile firings, of which 429 were successful. The D-5 launch system conducted more launches than any other Soviet launch system: a peak of 58 launches in 1971 and an average of 23.4 launches per year. During the service life of th e D-5U launch system 150 out of 161 missile firings were successful. Missile firings for military purposes were completed in 1988. Subsequently experimental launches were conducted for microgravity research purposes.
http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/russia/slbm/r-27.htm
Here is a related article on this subject:
quote:
Is North Korea crazy enough to court annihilation? (by Rosemary Righter)
THE DAY that North Korea sends ships or submarines equipped with ballistic missiles into the Pacific, the United States will come within range of nuclear attack by a militaristic dictatorship headed by a ruthless and paranoid near-recluse. That moment, according to research published this week in Jane‚s Defence Weekly, is imminent.
Both contenders for the White House must hope that it does not happen before the first Tuesday in November, because neither has a particularly reassuring strategy for dealing with a dramatically altered threat from this singularly awkward quarter. Ever since North Korea was first caught trying to build bombs in 1994, successive Democrat and Republican administrations have been trying to bribe North Korea into relinquishing its nuclear ambitions. They have tried differing methods, with similar lack of success. The Bush Administration has just seen its most serious, detailed aid-for-disarmament proposal to date dismissed by Pyongyang as „a sham‰. John Kerry, who believes that a „more sincere‰ attitude would have North Korea eating out of America‚s hand, brings the haplessly credulous Jimmy Carter to mind.
North Korea‚s nuclear arsenal is limited - it probably has between one and eight bombs - but its missile technology is impressive. In addition to the Scuds that it sells to nasty customers from the Khyber Pass to the Mediterranean, North Korea has the 1,250-mile Taepodong 1 (flown over Japan in 1998). It could soon test the 5,000-mile Taepodong 2, which could theoretically reach the western United States. It is this missile capacity that makes its nuclear programmes so dangerous.
The two new systems it is reported to have developed resemble, with good reason, the ballistic missiles carried on Cold War-vintage Soviet R27 submarines. A land-based version with a range of 2,500 miles could reach all of East Asia and US mi litary bases in the Pacific; the seaborne model‚s range is 1,500 miles. Scant comfort though it is to nearby non-nuclear Japan, missiles launched from land are relatively easy to detect. But sea-launched missiles are another matter; in the vastness of the Pacific, they are the maritime equivalent of stealth weapons.
North Korea has several times gone through the motions of trading in its nuclear weapons programmes for substantial bribes, while clandestinely accelerating their development. Confronted with US evidence in October 2002, the regime admitted to working on uranium enrichment. That activity began in 1997, at a time when North Korea had promised the Clinton Administration to dismantle its plutonium-based programme in return for two free civilian nuclear reactors, quantities of free oil and massive economic aid.
The Bush Administration then tried „more for more‰; bigger incentives, modelled on the offers made to post-nuclear Libya, but no upfront payments without a verifiable start on nuclear disarmament. It has also tried hard to unite North Korea‚s neighbours, involving China, Russia and Japan, along with South Korea, in six-nation talks. Yet, embarrassingly, if North Korea succeeds in threatening the US directly with these new missile systems, it will be courtesy of technology from Russia and a middleman in Japan.
Russia‚s lax supervision of surplus Soviet hardware has long been a headache. It figures prominently in the International Atomic Energy Agency register of black market traffic in nuclear and radioactive material. Pyongyang‚s active quest for submarine-based missiles can be traced back to 1992, when the Russians detained scientists from Chelyabinsk, the developers of the R27, as they stepped on a plane to Pyongyang. Some of their colleagues, Jane‚s reports, made the journey later.
But it was a military fire sale in 1993 that gave Pyongyang its big break. That was when Russia sold 12 R27 submarines, ostensibly as „scrap metal‰, to a Japanese dealer - who then flogg ed them to the North Korean Navy. Some of them had been equipped to fire ballistic missiles. The missiles and firing systems had been removed, but the vessels retained their launch tubes and stabilisation systems - enough for the production of copycat seagoing ballistic missile systems.
The threat, the Pentagon insists, remains theoretical, because North Korea has no submarines capable of carrying missiles within range of the US. Yet who knows to what uses those Russian „scrap‰ vessels might have been put? The bottom line for most Western analysts is that, since it would be patently suicidal for North Korea to attack US forces, let alone US territory, it will not happen. Crazy this failed state may be, the logic runs, but not so crazy as to court annihilation.
Yet Pyongyang‚s policy is still to „liberate‰ the South by force, and it has enough missiles trained on Seoul to flatten most of the South Korean capital in minutes. Kim Jong Il may believe that the US would not intervene at the risk of nuclear attack on its territory. This militarised dictatorship, presiding over a horribly malfunctioning state, could take the risk.
Kim Jong Il is an unknown quantity; so is the extent of the authority he wields. Cults of personality can deceive. The Dear Leader has the military always at his shoulder, if not wrapped round his throat. They want the money that nuclear blackmail buys; but even more, they are out to defend the warped „military first‰ culture that sustains their privileges.
North Korea gets away with nuclear blackmail because the alternative is „too difficult‰ to contemplate, and because, at bottom, it is thought to be weak enough to be bribed. The outside world‚s best strategists have no other strategy for dealing with this threat except the still unthinkable: direct military attack to overwhelm the regime. Perhaps, however, not before it had loosed nuclear missiles on Japan, if not the US itself. It is irrational to rule out the irrational. This regime can survive only in the per mafrost of isolation. If its elite came to fear penetration, rationality cannot be assumed.
-The Times
http://www.thepeninsulaqatar.com/commentary/commentaryother.asp?file=augustcommentary252004.xml
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