Israel, India and Pakistan Developing Biological Weapons?

December 7, 2004
By Khalid Hasan
Pakistan Daily Times

Washington: Pakistan and India may be working on developing biological weapons, according to a new report.

The finding comes from the newly-minted Centre for the Study of Weapons of Mass Destruction at the Department of Defence. The outfit is funded by the National Defence University.

The report says, “Several other countries are suspected of pursuing offensive biological weapons (BW) research, development, and possibly weaponisation, including North Korea, China, and Iran. Nations that have the potential to develop offensive BW and that may possibly be conducting limited efforts include Pakistan, Cuba, Israel, India, and Syria. Still other states retain the capacity to mobilise resources rapidly in support of BW programmes. Most of these countries are parties to or signatories of the Biological Weapons Convention, and, consequently, any offensive programmes undertaken would violate their obligations under that treaty.”

Turing to the war on terror, the report points out that it has already presented the United States with nonproliferation policy tradeoffs. In the case of Pakistan, it asserts, “since September 11, 2001, Pakistan’s role in the war on terror has replaced its role as a proliferator as the central focus of US policy. The question is no longer (as it was a few years ago) ‘Should Pakistan be legitimised as a nuclear weapon state?’ but rather, ‘How can we ensure that Pakistan remains stable and committed to the war on terror and that its nuclear weapons remain secure?’ The nuclear arms race on the subcontinent remains an important concern, but in practical terms, this has become a lower priority in relation to the war on terror. This has meant, for instance, a return to normal relations with Islamabad despite the nuclear tests of 1998 and the military coup of 1999, the lifting of nonproliferation sanctions, and the muted reaction to evidence of Pakistani assistance to North Korea’s (and possibly Iran’s) uranium enrichment program.”

The report also takes up the possibility of Pakistan becoming a “failed state. It expresses concern that Pakistan about Islamabad’s “growing nuclear arsenal and a friendly government under pressure from within and without.” It goes on to state, “While our worst fears with respect to Pakistan have not come to pass, we cannot ignore the possibility of nightmare scenarios in which extremist elements, perhaps with the support or assistance of sympathisers in the armed forces and intelligence services, come to power in Islamabad or gain control of some or all of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons. Uncertainty regarding the physical security of Pakistan’s weapons also raises the possibility of the theft of one or more weapons.”

The report devotes a good deal of space to the Dr AQ Khan affair. To quote from the document, “What was not publicly known, until recently, is that he also led an extensive international network for the proliferation of nuclear technology and know-how. For decades, Mr. Khan remained on the Pakistani government payroll, earning a modest salary. Yet, he and his associates financed lavish lifestyles through the sale of nuclear technologies and equipment to outlaw regimes stretching from North Africa to the Korean Peninsula. AQ Khan, himself, operated mostly out of Pakistan. He served as director of the network, its leading scientific mind, as well as its primary salesman. Over the past decade, he made frequent trips to consult with his clients and to sell his expertise. He and his associates sold the blueprints for centrifuges to enrich uranium, as well as a nuclear design stolen from the Pakistani government. The network sold uranium hexafluoride, the gas that the centrifuge process can transform into enriched uranium for nuclear bombs. Khan and his associates provided Iran and Libya and North Korea with designs for Pakistan’s older centrifuges, as well as designs for more advanced and efficient models.

The network also provided these countries with components, and in some cases, with complete centrifuges.

“To increase their profits, Khan and his associates used a factory in Malaysia to manufacture key parts for centrifuges. Other necessary parts were purchased through network operatives based in Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. These procurement agents saw the trade in nuclear technologies as a shortcut to personal wealth, and they set up front companies to deceive legitimate firms into selling them tightly controlled materials. Khan’s deputy - a man named BSA Tahir - ran SMB Computers, a business in Dubai. Tahir used that computer company as a front for the proliferation activities of the AQ Khan network. Tahir acted as both the network’s chief financial officer and money launderer. He was also its shipping agent, using his computer firm as cover for the movement of centrifuge parts to various clients. Tahir directed the Malaysia facility to produce these parts based on Pakistani designs, and then ordered the facility to ship the components to Dubai. Tahir also arranged for parts acquired by other European procurement agents to transit through Dubai for shipment to other customers.

“This picture of the Khan network was pieced together over several years by American and British intelligence officers. Our intelligence services gradually uncovered this network’s reach, and identified its key experts and agents and money men. Operatives followed its transactions, mapped the extent of its operations. They monitored the travel of AQ Khan and senior associates. They shadowed members of the network around the world, they recorded their conversations, they penetrated their operations, we’ve uncovered their secrets.

This work involved high risk, and all Americans can be grateful for the hard work and the dedication of our fine intelligence professionals. Governments around the world worked closely with us to unravel the Khan network, and to put an end to his criminal enterprise. AQ Khan has confessed his crimes, and his top associates are out of business. The Government of Pakistan is interrogating the network’s members, learning critical details that will help them prevent it from ever operating again. President Musharraf has promised to share all the information he learns about the Khan network, and has assured us that his country will never again be a source of proliferation.”

http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=story_7-12-2004_pg7_10