December 3, 2006
Dani Berkovich
INSS Insight
The political crisis in Lebanon, which threatens to drag the state into even greater domestic turmoil, also constitutes a theater for another clash between the United States and its supporters, on the one hand, and the camp of “resistance,” on the other, over the regional order. Consequently, while the competing Lebanese factions fortify their positions, the key to any easing of the crisis actually resides elsewhere.
The latest confirmation of this reality is provided by the assassination of the Christian Industry Minister, Pierre Gemayel. That event, following a series of other assassinations that raised suspicions of Syrian complicity, implies further domestic upheaval because it has energized opponents of Hizbullah, to the point where Hizbullah has been forced to delay temporarily plans for a serious escalation in its campaign to bring down the Lebanese government. But it is still likely to constitute another rung on the ladder of escalation, and the postponement of Hizbullah's mass demonstration by one week does not forestall that eventuality.
In declaring war on the government of Prime Minister Hana Siniora, Hizbullah launched its “second front,” this time at home. The Lebanese state, which for years was an object of Hizbullah contempt, has now become another threat which, like Israel, needs to be neutralized. Following the adoption of Security Council Resolution 1701, the Lebanese government has, for the first time, created the conditions to constraint Hizbullah's power with the help of international involvement. The organization understands that the rules of the game have changed and that it can no longer solve - or, more precisely, obscure - the question of its status by means of a sterile “National Dialogue.” As a result, it has resorted to the threat of extra-parliamentary action -- mass demonstrations - and mobilization of its Shi'ite constituency, which are intended to overthrow the government.
It now appears that the inherent tension between the Lebanese state and Hizbullah over the past few years is about to explode into open confrontation and that the organization is fully prepared for this. Indeed, there are clear parallels between the way Hizbullah has waged its struggle with Israel and the measures to which it resorts in the domestic context: it seems to be operating according to prior planning for each stage of escalation intended ultimately to topple the Siniora government and replace it with one more friendly to Hizbullah, it promises “surprises,” it relies on deterrence, and it prepares in advance for extreme scenarios. What completes the picture is the interference of Syria and Iran, which are also interested in overthrowing Siniora.
An even more worrisome parallel is the exaggerated self-assurance Hizbullah displays in its capabilities and strength, which turned so many against it after its decision to abduct an Israeli soldier on 12 July sparked a war that no one wanted. Now Hizbullah seems ready to ignite confessional conflict, dressing it up in slogans about fair representation and democracy and even pushing for early parliamentary elections in the belief, perhaps rational from its point of view, that the other side will blink first and back down out of fear of civil war. Only this time it does not seem that its rivals are prepared to give up. And the determination of the Lebanese state is not Hizbullah's only worry; it must also be concerned by the very fragility of the state, which could drag the entire system down into another civil war - something that Hizbullah also prefers to avoid.
At the same time, this crisis is not just a domestic drama. It has ramifications for the entire region and perhaps even further afield, because many other parties have much at stake in the way this drama plays out. The crisis is rightly described as a new “cold war” over design of the regional order, and the competing ideologies are American-sponsored “stability” (supported by most of the Sunni Arab world) and “resistance” (supported by Syrian and Iran). Lebanon is another theater of operations alongside the Palestinian and Iraqi theaters that are already engaged.
In this confrontation, Syria's role is especially prominent. Damascus apparently seeks the overthrow of the Siniora government and spares no effort to promote this outcome in the hope that Siniora's downfall will disrupt steps to establish an international tribunal to investigate and charge suspects in the murder of former Prime Minister Rafiq al-Hariri. In pursuing this goal, Syria seems not to care about “throwing out the baby with the bathwater.” From its perspective, the worst-case scenario of breakdown in Lebanon might actually help it to restore Syrian control of Lebanon (just as it did in 1976). Nor is it overly concerned about American warnings, perhaps because it still believes that the United States needs Syria in order to work out an exit strategy from Iraq and might be prepared to “trade” Lebanon away in return. Thus, Bashar al-Asad continues to play a double game - stretching one hand westward for peace (including declarations of readiness to resume negotiations with Israel) while simultaneously using the other hand to shower sparks over the Lebanese powder-keg.
Lebanon is already caught in a dynamic of crisis and even if there is a temporary easing of tensions because the rival factions manage to work out a compromise, this will only buy them time until the next flare-up. For Lebanon really to extract itself from the crisis, two conditions need to be met:
Determined involvement by the international community and the Sunni Arab world to strengthen the Siniora government and restrain Syrian and Iranian intervention. Syria has a more direct role in calming things down and may also be more subject than Iran to more effective levers of influence, i.e., to a policy combining positive inducements and sanctions;
A rupture of the link between Hizbullah and the Shi'ite community (a complex process that depends on the existence of an attractive alternative) and Hizbullah's isolation from its domestic allies, especially Christian leader Michel Aoun and the leader of Amal, Nabih Berri.
Siniora's ability to implement SC Resolution 1701 will be further constrained by ongoing instability, and if he is overthrown and replaced by a unity government in which the March 14 movement has even less influence, 1701 will become a dead letter. If that happens, the outbreak of another Israel-Hizbullah war will just be a matter of time.