Steve Quayle News Alerts

September 24, 2002
By Stephen Fidler and David White in London

The keenly awaited British government document on the threat posed by Iraq's weapons of mass destruction was viewed by defence specialists as making a strong case about why the world should worry about Saddam Hussein.

But it was not regarded as providing a conclusive case justifying military action in the next few months to unseat the Iraqi leader. US officials have said the hardest question they have to answer in persuading other countries to back regimen change in Iraq is: "Why now?"

"It is an alarming picture. But whether it adds anything to what we already know, I rather doubt," said John Garnett, chairman of the Centre for Defence Studies at King's College, London.

John Chipman, director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, said the dossier provided more detail on Iraq's procurement network and evidence of plans to extend the range of Iraq's missiles towards 1,000km.

It also made plain, he said, Iraqi measures aimed at concealing his weapons programmes from inspectors.

"It shows very clearly that weapons of mass destruction are very much at the heart of Saddam Hussein's military planning," he told BBC Radio. "If he had a nuclear weapon, he would be able to expand his regional political ambitions and attempt to invade Kuwait or Saudi Arabia and we might be deterred from defending them if he might be able to threaten us with a nuclear attack against Israel."

The document contains no startling or unexpected disclosures, but attempts to set out the case that Iraq has in recent years intensified efforts to build biological, chemical and nuclear weapons, and the missiles to deliver them. It suggests that Iraq has taken advantage of the absence of weapons inspectors from the country since 1998 and increased funding from illicit earnings from oil smuggling.

The picture "in recent months has become more not less worrying," Tony Blair said in a foreword to the report. Despite UN sanctions on Iraq, the policy of containing Iraq had not worked well enough to stop the Iraq leader from developing the weapons, he said.

Yet the dossier was cautious in its assessment of Iraq's nuclear weapons capability, concluding that while United Nations sanctions remained effective, Iraq would not get a nuclear weapon.

The document concluded that without sanctions Iraq would take five years to produce enough nuclear material to produce its own bombs, and if the material was bought or stolen from abroad, from one to two years. But it was not clear how this assessment had changed over recent years. US intelligence assessments giving a similar time frame have not changed over many years.

It provided new examples of Iraqi procurements efforts in this field, but gave few supporting details.

The document left little room for doubt in its assessment that the Iraqi regimes possesses both biological and chemical weapons, and can deliver them. But it gave no indication of the likely success of such delivery means: most of its arsenal contains so-called "impact-fused" munitions, which destroy much of the agent they are delivering.

It also provides a hard assertion that Iraq has kept some 20 al-Hussein missiles, with a 650 km range, and evidence that work is under way on a variety of missile programmes. But apart from saying that Baghdad has tried to obtain equipment to improve its missile guidance systems, it gives no assessment on the accuracy of those missiles.

The document was based in part on the work of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), a group of senior officials including representatives from the three British intelligence and security services that advises the prime minister.

The main conclusions of the report are:

Chemical and biological weapons: Iraq has chemical and biological weapons, which represent "the most immediate threat from Iraqi weapons of mass destruction", and can deliver them with bombs, shells, artillery rockets and ballistic missiles.

It cited unspecified intelligence that Iraq had by the first half of 2000 started to produce biological warfare agents in mobile facilities, which could be more easily concealed from military attack or inspection.

By mid-2001, the JIC assessed that Iraq had precursor stocks and equipment "to produce significant quantities of mustard gas within weeks and of nerve agents within months". A number of plants, capable of producing chemical agents and precursor chemicals as well as biological agents, had been rebuilt.

It said subsequent intelligence confirmed chemical and biological weapons "play an important role in Iraqi military thinking", and that Mr Hussein was willing to use them against his own Shia population. "Intelligence indicates that the Iraqi military are able to deploy chemical and biological weapons within 45 minutes of an order to do so."

The authority to use such weapons lies with Mr Hussein but "intelligence indicates that he may also have delegated this authority to his son, Qusai"

Nuclear weapons: Iraq has not yet got a nuclear weapon, but continued research into it after 1998. The JIC assessed earlier this year that sanctions on Iraq were hindering crucial imports needed to produce fissile material.

"The JIC judged that while sanctions remain effective Iraq would not be able to produce a nuclear weapon. If they were removed or prove ineffective, it would take at least five years to produce sufficient fissile material for a weapon indigenously," it said.

However, it adds that if Iraq obtained fissile material and other essential components from foreign sources "Iraq could produce a nuclear weapon in between one and two years".

Iraq is seeking its own capability to enrich uranium using on gas centrifuges, but is also seeking to obtain fissile material on the black market, the dossier says. "There is intelligence that Iraq has sought the supply of significant quantities of uranium from Africa".

The report lists some of the equipment Iraq has sought to obtain for gas centrifuges: vacuum pumps, an entire magnet production line, anhydrous hydrogen fluoride and fluorine gas, a large filament winding machine and a balancing machine. It also cites repeated efforts to import 60,000 or more specialised aluminium tubes usable in such centrifuges.

Ballistic missiles: The report contains significant detail on Iraq's ballistic missile programme, referring to a "step change" in progress on such missiles and bolder missile procurement efforts.

The document assesses that Iraq retained up to 20 al-Hussein missiles - with a range of 650 kms, putting Cyprus, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Israel within range - from before the Gulf War. These missiles could carry conventional, chemical or biological warheads.

This year, the JIC concluded that Iraq had begun to develop missiles with a range of over 1,000kms, but that if sanctions remained effective the Iraqis would not be able to produce such a missile before 2007. Satellite imagery showed a new engine test stand being constructed for such medium-range missiles at a test facility at Al-Rafah/Shahiyat.

Iraq is allowed to work on missiles with ranges of up to 150kms, but the report says Iraq is working on extending the range of such "legal" liquid and solid fuel missiles.

A new plants at al-Mamoun for making ammonium perchlorate, a key ingredient in the production of solid fuel for missiles, has been built with help from the Indian chemical engineering company, NEC Engineers Private Ltd. This company, which the report says has extensive links with Iraq, is the only private entity mentioned in the report. The Indian government, it says, has recently suspended its export licence.

"Intelligence makes it clear that Iraqi procurement agents and front companies in third countries are seeking illicitly to acquire propellant chemicals for Iraq's ballistic missiles." It says there is no evidence these programmes have been inhibited by a lack of funds. Illicit earnings from oil smuggling have grown from $800m to $1bn in 1999 to $3bn last year and an estimated $3bn this.

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